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Abstract
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that operate on the principle of system call
monitoring are known to be susceptible to mimicry or evasion attacks. It has been shown
that an intelligent adversary armed with comprehensive knowledge of the target system
or network, can penetrate these targets, hide his presence from the IDS, and continue to
carry out damage. IDSs, which use system calls to define normal behavior, often leave
out complimentary information about them, and intruders use precisely this drawback, to
deceive the IDS.
This thesis investigates the vulnerabilities of a system call based IDS and carries out a
theoretical and experimental study of methods allowing to improve the IDS performance
and reliability. It analyzes the design principles and architecture of anomaly based IDSs
and studies the implementation ofa typical system call based anomaly IDS. This category
of anomaly detection systems is currently attracting considerable attention within the
research community and various prototypes have been developed in recent years. The
thesis investigates the hypothesis that by monitoring the number of system calls that fail
and return error values on a per process basis, it would be possible to identify abnormally
behaving processes. It also suggests that by using only a certain set of critical system
calls instead of all the defined calls, it could be possible to detect and stop mimicry
attacks. pH IDS is used for the purpose of the experiments as its source code is freely
available. It works as a patch to the Linux kernel and alters the way system calls are
handled. The tests were carried out on a stand-alone Linux box running RedHat 9 with
kernel version 2.4.20. Local exploits, which were readily available on the Internet, were
used in the experiments.
Some of the results obtained contradicted our original hypothesis and are indicative of the
scope for future work in this area. The tests revealed that it was not possible to simply use
system call return values to identify erroneously behaving processes. However after
classifying the system calls into critical and non-critical sets, a form ofmimicry attacks
could be successfully detected. The results confirm the potential of this technique to
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With the advent of the Internet and high-speed access links, networks have been thrown
open to the outside world and can be accessed with considerable ease as compared to
those of 10 years ago. With this increase in availability of services, there also exists the
increased threat of illegal access and misuse of systems. The source of this threat to the
integrity of resources and services can be either internal (e.g. somebody within the
organization) or external (e.g. a hacker paid by a business competitor to siphon out
sensitive data). Irrespective of the sources, it is necessary to safeguard systems and
maintain their appropriate and legal use. This is where Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) come into the picture.
Intrusion detection is the process ofmonitoring the state and use of a system to detect the
presence of unauthorized activity. Many features and characteristics of system can be
used to construct views of normal activity; the system can then be monitored
continuously to spot any divergence from these normal views. Alternately, known cases
of intrusions are used as a reference and the behavior of the system is observed to detect
any similarity to behavior of a system that is compromised by these known attacks.
Response to intrusions has traditionally not been considered as a necessary feature of
intrusion detection systems, but of late, considerable research effort has being directed
towards integrating an automatic response mechanism in these systems.
Intrusion Detection Systems deal with a little piece of the problem of computer security.
In a typical scenario, an IDS would accompany other security mechanisms like firewalls,
anti virus software and integrity checkers, all of which deal with the same problem at
different levels. The task of preventing systems from falling in to the hands of intruders
or hackers can be seen as consisting of two phases: preventing attacks from occurring
and realizing that attacks are inevitable and directing efforts to early detection. Intrusion
detection systems are directed toward the latter stage, where the goal is to minimize
damage caused by a security violation. The typical response of an intrusion detection
system is to 'raise an
alarm'
and notify the system administrator, who in turn checks for
false positives and then takes remedial action ifnecessary.
1.2 pH IDS
The pH IDS is a host-based anomaly intrusion detection system and was designed and
developed at the University of New Mexico by Anil Somayaji et al [23]. It can be
considered as representative of the entire class of intrusion detection systems that use
system call monitoring. The underlying detection algorithm of pH IDS is based on the
generic approach of using system call sequence information for constructing definitions
of normal program activity, first suggested by Stephanie Forrest et al [7]. One of the
unique characteristics of pH is that it can also respond to intrusions and take preventive
action on its own, without the intervention of the system administrator. For this reason,
its authors have described it as 'autonomous response system', rather than an intrusion
detection system.
1.3 Problem definition and pitfalls of pH IDS
Results of preliminary analysis and experiments carried out by Forrest [2,3] show that,
system call monitoring is a very effective approach to do intrusion detection. Forrest
extensively used the 'sendmail program for testing purposes and
'//?/-'
in certain cases.
'SendmaiV was a good choice because it is fiirly complex, generates many variations of
legal behavior and there are many known attacks to which it is susceptible. In their
results, increased instances of abnormal activity could be detected in instances of
successful intrusions by some known attack scripts. Though these tests were carried out
on SPARC machines with SunOS, the same results could be reproduced on variants of
UNIX*
,
with slight or no modifications. The pH IDS, which was based on the above
principle and was developed for a Linux kernel displayed similar results when further
tests were carried exploiting the vulnerabilities in SSH daemon [23].
From the above documented results and reports of the performance of pH IDS it can be
concluded that this approach (and the ph IDS) is fairly successful against a broad variety
and classes of attacks and is not just limited to certain typical programs. Once a
vulnerability in a program has been exploited and the intruder injected his malicious
code, it is highly probably that ph IDS will recognize the abnormal traces and raise an
alarm before wide scale damage occurs. However, Wagner and Sato have shown the
failure ofpH IDS in stoppingmimicry or evasion attacks [27]. In these attacks, intruders
try to hide their presence, try not to generate abnormal traces of system calls, and then
attempt to 'slip under the radar'. Since the IDS does not see anything which it deems
'suspicious', it fails to trigger an alarm. When using system call information to learn
about normal behavior ofprocesses, many aspects of system calls can be considered (e.g.
parameter values passed to system calls, the return values obtained after their execution,
the relative frequencies of system calls, the timing of system calls with respect to the
other notable events in the program flow, and so on). pH only uses sequence information
or relative ordering information of system calls. This design has very little overhead and
is relatively less complex. But the simplicity of pH IDS creates potential for an intruder
to break in. The authors of [27] have suggested some ways in which these attacks can be
carried out and this raises two issues: how to modify pH IDS to mitigate these kind of
attacks, and the practical risk involved in these kind of attacks. I focus on both of these
issues in my thesis.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 throws some light on
the broad area of Computer Security and the role of Intrusion Detection Systems. It talks
about the different categories of intrusion detection systems and their features and
UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group.
touches on the current state of research in this area. Some of the significant research work
and papers are referenced and a background is created for the reader who may not be
familiar with the concepts and current policies in this domain.
Chapter 3 discusses the working of the pH IDS. I look at the underlying architecture of
the system and explain in brief the working of this system. The environment in which pH
is implemented is described. Some of the salient results obtained by the authors of the
system are noted. I explain the susceptibility ofpH IDS to evasion and mimicry attacks as
outlined byWagner and Sato [27].
Chapter 4 establishes our hypothesis. I outline a few approaches to tackling the problem
and describe the tests and experiments that were carried out and the rationale behind
them. The goal of these experiments was to evaluate some of the suggested solutions,
eliminate those, which do not yield satisfactory results and at the least, establish a few
pointers for future work, which might generate foolproof solution to this problem.
Chapter 5 documents the results obtained from the tests. These are used to draw
conclusions and test our assumptions and hypothesis. I try to correlate the actual results
obtained and our expected results and explain the discrepancies, when they occur. I also




2.1.1 What are we dealing with?
Because of advancement in microprocessor technology, closer coupling between
operating system architectures and programming languages and multiplication of
resources due to wide deployment of distributed systems and networks, we are today able
to get more output from our systems than was even imaginable a few years ago. Increased
computing capability means that today's systems and applications now have significantly
greater functionality, as well as being both, faster and larger. However, the downside to
this has been that they have also become more complicated and thus, more unstable,
prone to crashes, security violations, abuse and loss ofproductivity.
The nature of our networks and pervasiveness of today's Internet only add to the
problems faced by system administrators and personnel in charge of scripting security
policies. The Internet is an unbounded network; remote hosts are added and deleted
randomly and it is very difficult (if not impossible), to predict their behavior while they
are connected to the network. The network protocols on which these networks operate
were designed decades ago, when the number of hosts was far less. Security was not a
primary goal of the designers and so these protocols were inherently insecure (e.g. IP
addresses, which are essentially a sequence of bits, is the only mechanism used to
authenticate the two communicating hosts).
To make matters worse from the security point of view, computer systems and networks
are not static entities and they display constant changes in their characteristics. The
number of hosts connected to a network can vary unpredictably; system and application
software are constantly updated as newer versions come out; the number of legitimate
users accessing these systems is variable; and, most importantly, definition of what
constitutes legitimate behavior is also dynamic. In this environment, it becomes harder to
distinguish between abnormal activity or state of a system caused by a security violation
and hitherto unseen activity that is simply a result of evolving user behavior.
Consequently it becomes critical that we focus our research efforts on producing more
reliable, fault tolerant and secure systems, networks and programs. Computer security is
not just limited to detection of intrusions, but also consists of guaranteeing integrity of
data, ensuring availability of services and preventing violations of security policies.
2.1.2. Who are we dealing with?
Originally, hacking was the domain of the elite and exclusive group of computer savvy
geeks. Hacking into systems required access to resources like fast processors, large
amounts of memory and above all expert level technical know-how. The hacking
community prided itself on its exploits; the motivation for breaking systems and code
was usually a desire to impress others with one's technical ingenuity. There were
instances when hackers were paid to break into organizations by a rival business
competitor, but there were in the minority.
But hacking is no longer restricted to the geek community. Ironically, it is the wide
availability of information on this topic on the internet, that enables anybody with
Internet access and a reasonably
well-equipped computer to be in a position to cause
damage by spreading internet worms, spamming email, injecting trojan code and
breaking into systems by use of malicious code. There exist entire websites dedicated to
the education of the average user in the art of computer hacking. They contain snippets of
code, tutorials and listings of known exploits, and automated tools that sniff networks,
identify vulnerable machines, extract host information.
The threat to the security of systems is not limited to hackers or crackers who are external
to the organization. Security violations also occur from within the organization itself and
often all that is required is local user access to your network. A user with normal
privileges may use an exploit against vulnerability in a program to gain elevated
privileges and access sensitive data, modify records, install back doors or delete system
files.
2.1.3 Generic approaches to computer security
Thomas Longstaff et al [18] classified acts of security violations in the following manner.
Whenever information or resources of a system are copied or read by an unauthorized
user, it constitutes loss ofconfidentiality. Whenever resources are corrupted intentionally
or unintentionally, it constitutes loss of integrity. Whenever resources are deleted or
become unreachable, it constitutes loss ofavailability. In all instances,
'resources'
refers
to either the data that our systems hold or the services that they provide.
The first step towards ensuring the security of a system is to restrict access to the system.
A user wanting to connect to the computers must prove his identity. This is known as
authentication and generally involves verification through passwords and usernames.
After the authenticity of the user has been proved, the user is allowed to access certain
parts of the system, while certain features are hidden from him. This is known as
authorization, which defines what regions of a system a particular user can reach. This is
typically achieved by setting up privilege levels and read, write and execute permissions
on files and directories.
Another aspect of computer security is guarding data as it travels across the network.
During its trip from one host to another, it is likely that the data will pass through routers,
gateways and hosts that may not be a part of the organization. It thus becomes important
that these external entities are not able to comprehend the sensitive data or garble it
intentionally. For these purposes, mechanisms like encryption are used to make the data
unintelligible to anyone other than the communicating parties.
A third category of computer security tools and mechanisms deals with monitoring the
system, detecting violations, and responding to them. Tools such as firewalls, file
integrity checkers, system scanners and, anti-virus programs are used to continuously
evaluate the state of a system, scrutinize the data flowing in and out of the boundaries of
a network, and generally look for any kind of suspicious activity, user or state of system
variables. Intrusion Detection Systems fall into this category. They assume that in spite of
best efforts, systems will be compromised; their goal is to detect these violations at the
earliest and minimize damage by taking appropriate remedial action.
2.2 Nature ofAttacks
Any activity that contradicts or diverges from the intended usage of a system and its
applications and violates the security policies of the organization is considered harmful.
Thus even stealthy probes that are carried to detect vulnerable hosts on a network are
dangerous as these probes are often followed by payload of the attack itself. Network
scanning, probing, website-defacing, account compromise, to the more prominent,
password cracking, denial of service attacks, malicious code and the complete disruption
ofnormal services are all forms ofhostile activity.
Some of the well documented ways of attacking a system [18, 20] are described below:
Probes and Scans: These are used to learn about the network, discover vulnerable hosts
and identify software being used, including operating system types, versions of various
programs, updates (if any) on installed programs. Stealthy probes do not usually
themselves damage the system, but should be considered just as dangerous as an actual
attack. These information gathering activities can be spread over a number of days and
even weeks, as ports, applications and hosts are scanned and tested, one after another.
Privilege Escalation: Known vulnerabilities in systems that have not been patched, may
be exploited to gain super-user status. The goal of this kind of activity is to gain access to
secure parts of the application and system and access or corrupt sensitive data. An
intruder may gain control of a local user account and proceed to escalate its privileges.
Denial of Service: These attacks are primarily carried out to make the systems or
applications unavailable and deny its authorized users access to services. They do not
necessarily access or modify the data held within the system. Hackers may generate
repeated requests of a particular application or flood a network with their packets thus
making it harder for legal users to access these resources.
Packet Sniffers: These are another form of stealthy attacks. These programs track packets
that flow over the network, and siphon out information from the encrypted data.
Typically these programs look for usernames and passwords and other authentication or
personal information, which is later used for forging identity.
Masquerading: In these kind of attacks, through clever manipulation of contents of
packets, intruders assume the appearance of trusted hosts and users. Thus if a network has
been set up to accept remote connections only from a few specific hosts, intruders
'masquerade'
as these trusted hosts and may fool the network into accepting them.
Trojan Code, Viruses, Worms: These are all examples of programs which can cause
damage on a large scale, affecting entire networks. Their presence is not easily identified
until after the damage has done. Typically require a user to execute some malicious code,
which then activates or triggers these viruses and worms. Often these are self-duplicating
and self-propagating, affecting all connected hosts.
2.3 Classification of Intrusion Detection Principles
Based on their detection principle Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be classified as
anomaly based or signature based. An anomaly based IDS initially, learns about the
normal behavior of a program or the system on the whole, by observing some predefined
characteristics. From this information, the anomaly based IDS tries to generate rules or
sets of conditions, which govern normal usage. After sufficient time has been spent
creating profiles of normal activity, it is then deployed and it monitors the network or
individual hosts. Any activity that diverges from what it has previously learned and does
not match the reference profiles, is flagged as anomalous. When sufficient suspect
behavior is observed, usually system administrators are notified. Note that it is necessary
to ensure that during this learning phase, there are no instances of an attack or an
intrusion, or else the IDS might learn about the attack itself.
In signature based IDS, previously known attack scripts and intrusions are used. Using
the history of such already detected attack vectors, databases of intrusive activities are
created. During the monitoring phase, these databases are used to examine all seen
activity. If there is a match between patterns of system calls or contents of a series of
packets or some other system observable and the contents of the database, it is certain
that the system is under attack.
There is also a category of intrusion detection systems that uses a combination of above
principles and is known as Compound IDS. The most popular example of such a system
is the IDES or Intrusion Detection Expert System [19], which was followed by the
NIDES orNext-generation IDES [1].
Anomaly-based IDSs suffer from the problem of false positives. It can be difficult for
them to distinguish between legitimate, changing user-behavior or less frequently
observed legal user behavior that was not seen during the learning phase, and real
novelties that occur because of an intrusion. Signature based IDS do not generate false
positives; however, the success of these depends on how efficiently and quickly the
database of known intrusions can be updated. This task is harder than it seems, because
even though, a newly discovered exploit can be fairly quickly added to the monitoring
database, it is often possible to generate variations of the same attack. Signature based
IDS are also unable to identify completely new attack vectors.
IntrusionDetection Systems can also loosely be classified on the basis ofwhere they are
deployed.When the IDS is deployed on the peripheries of a network and monitors traffic
in and out of the network, i.e. captures and analyses packets, it is known as a Network
Based IDS. On the other hand if an IDS is installed on a host and monitors activity that is
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restricted to that host, it is known as Host Based IDS. Host Based IDS can also use
network traffic in and out of the host to monitor behavior.
A more detailed sub-classification of these systems, based on their learning mechanism,
can be found in [2]. To summarize, in anomaly-based systems, the reference databases
contain valid behavior while in signature-based systems the reference databases contain
samples of illegal behavior. The above discussion leads us to the question ofwhat are the
contents of these databases. Various attributes of a system or a network have been used to
classify normal or abnormal behavior ofprocesses and programs. I discuss these below.
2.4 Current state of research
IDS TYPE FEATURES
IDES/NIDES [6,7] Anomaly and Signature
Based
Use profiles of user
behavior
TRIPWIRE [13] Anomaly Based Checks attributes of
system files
NADIR [12] Network Based Monitors network traffic
DIDS [11] [10] Network Based Monitors network traffic
TIM [25] Anomaly Based Creates profiles from
user behavior
NSM [9] Anomaly Based Network
IDS
Monitors network traffic
Fig 2.1 Popular research Intrusions Detection Systems. Figures in brackets denote
their publications in References List.
Initial interest in the area of intrusion detection and specifically anomaly detection was
on focused using user behavior to define normal profiles. [19, 1, 12, 25, 5]. The criteria
used in characterizing normal user activity included typical requests made my users,
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programs and applications run, the timing of their actions, amount of time spent using
system resources and amount of system resources used. However the difficulties in this
approach were soon evident as the complexity of applications, the size ofnetworks and
number of users began to grow. 'Normal user
behavior'
included a wide range of actions
and was never stable. The dynamic nature of evolving legitimate user behavior made the
learning process harder.
The system call approach to anomaly intrusion detection was first proposed by Forrest
[2,3] and has received considerable interest from the research community. A combination
of some attributes of a process or a program and the system calls that they generate, can
be used to characterize normal behavior. System call information of a process can reveal
a wide range of further information about the status of the process in the kernel (e.g. its
interactions with other system resources like the network, the file system, the daemons
running in the background, the devices that are mounted, and its memory requests).
Forrest [2, 3] prototyped an intrusion detection system that used traces sequences of
system calls to identify normal program behavior. In their approach, the intrusion
detection system was made to synthetically learn about normal program behavior. During
monitoring if a different sequence of system calls was observed, an anomaly was flagged.
Wepsi [15] implemented an intrusion detection system based on the system call approach
but they used variable length patterns in creating profiles, unlike Forrest's original work
[7]. They also used audit trail patterns (certain specific events collected from log files),
which represent the behavior of a process on a more superficial level than actual system
calls. Liao and Vemuri [17] take a slightly different approach to using system calls.
Instead ofkeeping track of sequences of calls, they monitor the frequency of system calls
that are issued by a program. By doing this, they avoid having to treat every system call
individually and reduce the overhead involved in analyzing and storing every system call.
A system call is considered as an instance of a
'text'
and the whole set of calls issued as a
'document'. Proven text-processing techniques can be applied to classifying these
'documents'. Prior to this, Lee [16] tried to improve on the results obtained by Forrest [6]
by using machine learning algorithms to extract information from normal and abnormal
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sequences of system call traces. Frequency based methods were also explored by Helman
and Bhangoo [11]. Instead of keeping track of frequencies of every system call, they
recorded frequencies of sequences of system calls.
Kosoresow and Hofmeyer [15] used system call trace execution in a different manner.
They proposed to use finite state automata to model the sequences of system calls. No
specific method or algorithm was suggested by them for the creation of such automata.
Typically the program source code was used to derive a formal specification of program
behavior, which in turn was used as input to construct the automata. Sekar et al [21]
improved on this methodology and came up with a finite state automata based automatic
learning process that used system call and program counter information to model the state
of the automata.
Other metadata about program behavior, other than system call characteristics has also
been used to define normal or 'self. Ko et al [14] used formal program specification
language to create a rule base. They looked at the source code of a program to identify all
its legal actions and used this to create definitions of normal.
Clearly a lot of effort has been directed to the use of system call analysis in the area of
anomaly detection. It has been established conclusively that system call analysis can
reveal the details about program behavior. The current trend seems to be towards taking
the information gathered from this analysis and using it to easily and efficiently create
thresholds or boundaries that can distinguish between anomalous and legitimate evolving
user behavior (i.e. to reduce false positives). There also is some interest in borrowing
concepts from neural networks and artificial intelligence, such as unsupervised learning
techniques, to enable the detection system to learn about 'self on its own, unlike the
prevalent rule based synthetic learning mechanisms. Another area of intrusion detection
being explored is the problem of response. Typically the response of intrusion detection
systems has been to kill processes, kill remote logins, suspend user accounts and in
extreme instances isolate hosts altogether from the network. The drawbacks of these
responses are the overhead involved and expenses incurred in case of false positives. The
13
pH IDS handles this problem by delaying suspicious processes and
Somayaji [23] were
the first ones to propose such a mechanism.
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Chapter 3
Features and Vulnerabilities of pH IDS
3.1 Design of pH IDS
3.1.1 Process Homeostasis and definition of 'selP
Homeostasis refers to the ability of biological entities and especially humans to identify
'self. Humans use this property to maintain a stable internal environment. They can
detect when conditions like body temperature, amount and distribution of body fluids,
state of the immune system have altered, respond to such changes and reconstruct the
original balanced state. The immune system can detect the presence of foreign bodies like
viruses, bacteria and other external organisms and take corrective action to fight these
pathogens. This is possible because the human immune system can correctly identify
itself, i.e. it is 'self-aware'. It is almost as if the immune system maintains a mammoth
database describing the features and properties of various types of cells and body fluids
and continuouslymonitors for entities which show variations from this database.
The motivation for pH (Process Homeostasis) IDS comes from this ability of humans to
define self and identify variations from self. This concept corresponds nicely to the
principle behind anomaly intmsion detection. Maintaining computer or system security
can be considered analogous to the task of maintaining normal internal environment in
humans, although human physiological systems are far more complex than computer
systems. Just as the presence of a foreign body or a viral infection in humans, may result
in abnormal body temperatures or some other deviation from normal characteristics,
computer systems that are compromised do display signs of attacks and intrusions. The
challenge for anomaly intrusion detection systems is to intelligently generate definitions
of 'self and spot signs of deviation from these
'normal'
definitions at the earliest
moment possible, without consuming significant resources.
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Forrest [7] were the first to propose the idea of using system call information to create
definition of self for processes. They proposed that in the case of computer systems and
applications, 'self can be expressed on a per-process basis, by using the system call
history of the program which the process is executing. Various attributes of the system
calls a process executes can be used to collect information about whether the process is
behaving abnormally or not. The timing of the system calls, the arguments passed to
system calls, the program counter or instruction pointer values, separation between
certain specific system calls that is possibly measured as the hamming distance between
these calls, the frequency of certain calls, the instructions executed between system calls
can all be possibly used to learn about a normally behaving process. It is also feasible to
use a combination of these indicators. The only constraint in using these parameters is
that the detection system should not interfere with the normal execution of programs and
should carry out its analysis and monitoring transparently.
Forrest et al [7] looked at short sequences of system calls to generate profiles of normal
program behavior. This simple technique surprisingly, works just as well as any of the
other above mentioned possibilities, as proved byWarrender et al [28]. In this technique,
signatures of programs are created by, running them in a secure environment and
recording the traces of system calls that are executed. Thus the entire set of system calls
executed by a process, are broken down into sequences of length six, which are stored in
the normal database. (The length six was chosen by the authors after experimental
analysis and they suggest in general, lengths between six and fifteen for the sequences.)
One of the drawbacks of this approach was that there was no, theoretical reasons or
rationale given for the choice of this value.
Consider the following snapshot of system calls:
openQ, mmapQ, read(), socket, mmapQ, execveO, open(), readQ, closeQ.brkO
With this trace, openQ being the first system call and brk() the most recent system call








openQ, mmapO, readQ, socketO, mmapO
mmapQ, readQ, socketQ, mmapO, execveQ
read(), socketQ, mmapQ, execveQ, openQ
socketQ, mmapQ, execveQ, openQ, readQ
mmapQ, execveQ, openQ, readQ, closeQ
execveQ, openQ, readQ, closeQ, brkO
Fig 3.1 Sequences of system calls with window size of five.
These sequences would be recorded in the database as part of the normal profile for this
particular program. Profiles usually consist of thousands of such short sequences.
Interestingly, the size of a profile is not proportional to the size of the program. So, there
might be a program, which is smaller in size but generates more sequences than some
other larger program because the sequences generated are more related to the complexity
of the different execution paths within the program. If during the monitoring phase the
following pattern was observed,
socketQ, mmapQ, execveQ, openQ, writeQ
This would generate mismatches with the patterns stored in the normal database. Thus the
anomalously behaving process, which may have loaded another program (by the execveQ
call) and opened a file and written to it (instead of reading from it) will be detected.
The use of system call sequences for generating normal signatures can also be justified by
the fact that security violations are likely to produce abnormal system call invocations.
System calls are the only means by which a program operating in user space can enter
kernel space and make use of the services provided by the kernel. It is unlikely that an
attack script or piece of malicious code can operate without entering kernel space. Once
operation of a process shifts into kernel mode, it has potential to cause damage to critical
system files and resources. System calls act as the boundary between user space and
kernel space and are thus a good choice to watch interactions of a process with the
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underlying kernel. For an intrusion to succeedwithout attempting any system call, it must
operate entirely in user space. It is very difficult, if not impossible to achieve this, and it
is likely that such an attack is based on some glaring flaw or programming error in the
operating system itself. One such instance of this found in literature [27], involved older
versions of Solaris, where it was possible to assume root privileges simply by calling the
divide-by-zero interrupt handler. Such examples are fortunately not very common.
3.1.2 System call traces and pH IDS
Somayaji and Forrest [23] developed a working prototype of the system call based
anomaly detection system, the pH (Process Homeostasis) IDS. Though the prototype was
derived from the work of Forrest et al [7] as explained above, a slightly different
approach was taken by Somayaji [22] in storing system call sequences in the actual
implementation of pH. In fact, pH does not store call sequences. It uses
Took-ahead'
pans of system calls. These pairs are obtained by processing traces of system calls in a
'look-ahead'
window at any given point of time. The current system call is recorded and
the pairs it forms with 'n-1
'
previously seen system calls are recorded, where V is the
size of the look-ahead window. For example, if a window size of 5 is chosen, with 1
being the oldest system call seen and 5 being the latest or current system call, the
look-
ahead pairs generated by this sequence will be (5,1), (5,2), (5,3) and (5,4). Essentially the
same information is stored and used to create profiles, however it is represented in a
different manner.
Going back to the above example, consider the point in time when only the first three
system calls of that sequence have been observed and size of the look-ahead window is
five.
open mmap read socket mmap execve open read close brk
t
Current System Call
Contents of look-ahead window of size 5
*** *** open mmap read
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This state generates the following look-ahead pairs : (read , mmap ) , (read ,
*
, open)
As the look-ahead window moves forward and new system calls are encountered the
number of look-ahead pairs increases. The above sequence would generate the following
look-ahead pairs.
(n, n-1) (n, *, n-2) (n,*,*, n-3) (n,*,V,n4)
(mmap, open) (read, *, open) (socket, *, *, open) (mmap,*,*,*,open)
(read, mmap) (socket, *, mmap) (mmap, *, *, mmap) (execve,*,*,*,mmap)
(socket, read) (mmap, *,read) (execve, *, *, read) (open,*,*,*,read)
(mmap, socket) (execve, *, socket) (open, *, *, socket) (read,*,*,*,socket)
(execve, mmap) (open, *, mmap) (read, *, *, mmap) (close,*,*,*,mmap)
(open, execve) (read, *, execve) (close, *, *, execve) (brk,*,*,*,execve)
(read, open) (close, *, open) (brk, *, *, open)
(close, read) (brk, *, read)
(brk, close)
In the actual implementation of pH, a look-ahead window of size nine was used, which
generates eight look-ahead pairs per trace. To compare the look-ahead pair approach and
the original sequence method, let us consider the optimal or worst case scenario, where a
process or a program generates all the possible permutations and combinations of system
call sequences. Let us denote the total number of system calls as
''
and the size of our
look-ahead window and thus the length of our sequences as '/w'. Look-ahead pairs can be
stored in n x n bit arrays, thus we would require m-1 bit arrays of size n x n. In Linux
kernel version 2.4.20 , 255 system calls have been defined in Thus the
look-ahead pairs method would require 8
* 256
* 256 bits for storage that is equivalent to
64KB per program. On the other hand, sequence method, would require m
"
(in this case, 9256) bits that is a huge number.
*
Complete path is linux-2.4.20/include/asm/unistd.h on Red Hat Linux distribution, with source tree rooted
at linux-2.4.20
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The choice of nine as the look-ahead window size also serves another purpose. Since a
look-ahead window of length nine, generates a maximum of eight look-ahead pairs, byte
arrays with 256 * 256 locations or elements can be used to store the profiles of every
program. The presence or absence of a pair can then be represented as a bit map.
Consider the following example,




Fig 3.2 Contents of byte array storing system call look-ahead pairs.
The cell or byte corresponding to Sys Call 2 and Sys Call 3, consists of 8 bits which are
either set or reset, depending on the presence or absence of a pair containing these two
system calls. Thus if the fourth bit of that location is set, it denotes that there is some
sequence in which Sys Call 2 and Sys Call 3 occur with a separation of 4 system calls.
Similarly of the second bit is reset, it indicates that Sys Call 2 and Sys Call 3 have never
occurred in any sequence with a separation of two other system calls between them.
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3.2 Working of pH IDS
3.2.1 Implementation
The pH IDS is implemented as a patch to the Linux kernel. The authors of pH had
implemented it on a Linux box running Debian and with 2.4.20 kernel which was current
at that point of time. It monitors and intercepts the invocation of each system call by all
running or active processes, performs some bookkeeping operations, checks whether the
invocation of the call is permissible and if it is found to be satisfactory it passes control to
the interrupt handler.
System calls are treated as software interrupts since they pass control from the executing
user program to the system call handler routines in the kernel. System calls are the
interface between the library functions that are available to the user and their kernel
counterparts, which carry out the actual work. The arguments of the library function are
put in predefined registers and/or are located on the stack, the system call number is
placed in the EAX register and an interrupt is triggered. INT 0x80 is reserved in Linux
for system calls. The interrupt handler then uses the system call number to index into an
address table defined in entry. S that holds the address of the function that actually
does work for the system call. The return value from the system call is then placed as a
rule in the EAX register and made available to original library function. This mechanism
is described in a diagram below:
This mechanism is specific to the Intel architecture and Linux kernel. Other operating systems based on a
different platform, may have a different implementation.
**
Complete location is linux-2.4.20/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S, on a Red Hat Linux distribution, with source
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Pass return value back to libraryfunction.
Fig. 3.3 Sequence of events in system call execution.
pH alters this sequence of events. In entry . S just before the call to the sys_call
handler is made, a pH function is called. This function checks if the look-ahead pairs
generated by the current system call and previously seen eight system calls are present in
the normal database. If the pairs have previously been seen, the execution of the system
call continues normally. However, if one or more anomalous pairs are detected, the
execution of this system call is suspended and the process delayed. This delay is























cesses waitirg Kernel Space
Fig 3.4 Architectural overview of pH IDS. Adapted from [22]
3.2.2 Learning phase
In the learning phase pH observes the traces of system calls that are generated by a
program run in a secure environment and builds normal profiles as described above. This
database of normal profiles is known as the 'training data
set'
As new look-ahead pairs
are discovered during the learning phase, they are included in the training data set. Once
enough time has passed without the addition of any new pairs, the profile is set to be
ready for monitoring. pH uses a set of conditions to determine if it has seen enough
normal program behavior. After these conditions have been satisfied, it can begin the
monitoring phase and look for anomalous behavior.
The total number of system calls executed by all processes running a common program is
known as the ctrain_counf The number of system calls seen since the last addition to the
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profile is known as
'
last_mod_counf . pH checks the ratio
train_count/ (train_count - last_mod_count) . If this ratio is greater
than four, the profile is 'frozen', indicating that enough system calls have been seen
without any addition of new look-ahead pairs to the profile. If new look-ahead pairs are
found while the profile is frozen, the profile is
'thawed'
and last_mod_count is set to
zero. For the profile to be frozen again, pH waits for the above ratio to be greater than
four. The value of four was arbitrarily chosen and can be altered by the user. Note that if
there are two or more processes of the same program active, then all of these processes
contribute to the profile pairs.
The other condition that pH checks before it can begin monitoring, is to see if the profile
stays frozen for a certain length of time. If the profile stays frozen for a period of two
weeks, then it marks the profile as
'normal'
and pH begins monitoring for the program.
Both of these checks are necessary to prevent a profile from being prematurely classified
as normal. Consider the example of a program that is not frequently used, say once every
week. This program will satisfy the above ratio, but since it has not been invoked too
often, its profile is still incomplete. There are certain execution paths that will generate
new look-ahead pairs and these have not been included in the profile. If this profile is
marked as normal, without waiting for some period of time after it has been marked as
frozen, many false positives may be generated during the monitoring phase.
On the other hand consider some complex program that too is not run frequently. A
program like Mozilla Web Browser displays significant variation in execution patterns
and generates a large number of look-ahead pairs. If we only wait for a period of two
weeks, and do not check for the ratio condition, the profile may get classified as
normal since no new pairs are added to it in two weeks.
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3.2.3 Monitoring phase
Once the profile has been marked as normal, pH can shift its operation to the monitoring
phase. It does this by copying the training data set to the testing data set and uses the
testing data set for monitoring purposes. If a system call generates a look-ahead pair that
is not present in the testing data set an anomaly is recorded. For every process, pH
records the status of last 128 system calls seen. Each process is associated with a 128 bit
array, the contents ofwhich denote which of the last 128 system calls were anomalous.
This value is called the 'locality frame
count'
and is used to delay the process by
2
iocaiity_f rame_count * delay_factor . Delayjactor is a pH variable, which can be
manipulated by the user (e.g setting delayjactor to zero, effectively turns down pH's
responses). Thus, even if the current system call is not anomalous, its execution could be
delayed by the value computed above, if any of the last 128 system calls have been
marked as anomalous.
The anomalies generated by each profile are also stored in the variable
i
anomaly
Consider the example where two instances of vi editor are running, first of which has
generated a total of 125 anomalies and the other 55 anomalies. Assuming these were the
only instances of vi that were executed, the anomaly value for the entire profile of
vi is set to 1 80. Also, suppose the first vi process has generated 20 anomalous calls in its
last 128 calls, while 40 anomalies have been associated with the last 128 calls of the
second vi process. Thus the two processes will be delayed by different amounts and are
independent of the anomaly value of the whole profile, (the first process with a
locality of 20, will be delayed by
@20
* delay_factor) seconds,
while the second process with a locality of 40 will be delayed by
(240
* delay_factor) seconds.)
Once monitoring starts, the testing data set is not updated. Theoretically, no more new
look-ahead pairs should be spotted but practically, there always exist a few pairs of calls
that were not encountered during the learning phase. Such new look-ahead pairs observed
during monitoring are added to the training data set. These new anomalous pairs could
either be attributed to intrusive activity or simply, legal user actions which were not
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spotted during the learning phase. pH assumes that such first few occasional anomalous
calls are more likely to be the result of unseen user activity and includes them in training
data set. These are then included in the normal profile of the program, when the
training data set is periodically copied in to the testing data set.
3.2.4Manipulating pH
It is possible to control and dictate the response and actions of pH through three
commands that are a part of a utility provided with the source code of pH. It is possible
to
'reset'
pH on a per profile basis. This clears the training and testing data sets.
In spite of spending enough time in the learning phase, it could be possible that our
testing data set is incomplete and does not represent the entire range of behavior of a
program. If this is the case, then a process referring this profile could continue to generate
a large number of anomalies, which in reality are merely false positives. To identify this
event, every profile is associated with an
'
anomalyJimiV which specifies the maximum
number of anomalies that it can generate. If the anomaly of the profile exceeds its
anomalyJimit value, it is likely that such a profile is incomplete and we must discontinue
to use it. This is done by the
'tolerize'
command, which tells pH to stop monitoring and
begin the learning process again for the profile in question.
Since the new or anomalous pairs that are discovered during the monitoring phase, are
added to the training data set and eventually into the normal profile for the program, we
could accidentally learn about an attack. pH tackles this problem by limiting the number
of anomalies that are added to the training data set in the monitoring set. This limit is
called
'
tolerize and is associated with every process. If a particular process
generates more number of anomalies than this value, the
'sensitize'
command can be
used to tell pH that it should forget whatever new behavior it has learnt about this
process. This is done by, clearing the training data set.
*
This value, known astolerize_limit , is set to 12. Ifmore than 12 new pairs are seen, pH concludes that it
is probably learning about an attack and removes these new pairs and restores the profile to original state.
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3.3Mimicry Attacks
An attack or intrusion can be separated into two phases, an initial penetration phase and
an exploitation phase. During the penetration phase generally some vulnerability of the
system is used to gain access to the system. This first step often consists of gaining root
privileges. The actual damage is done in the exploitation phase, when malicious code is
executed to change the state of the system. This often also involves installing backdoors
to ensure the intruders can return whenever they want in future.
In mimicry attacks, intruders try to hide their presence during the exploitation phase.
They try to escape detection by removing all traces or their activity or camouflaging their
presence. They
'mimic'
the behavior of a normal user. Mimicry attacks are possible
because intruders can adapt their attacks to elude the detection algorithm of the IDS. It is
assumed that the intruders are aware of the internal operation of the IDS, are familiar
with its detection principle and can duplicate its behavior on other hosts.
Mimicry or evasion attacks on network intrusion detection systems have received some
attention in the past, although host based systems have not been looked at in great detail.
Chung et al [4] showed that by
'parallelizing'
a sequential attack script, it is possible to
distract the IDS. They showed that by using program parallelization techniques like
analysis of data dependency, control dependency and data flow, it is possible to break a
serial attack script into a concurrent or distributed script, which can be run by using
parallel threads of execution. Network Intrusion Detection Systems often employ a
'network
monitor'
observes the traffic of packets into and out of the network. These
network monitors have the requirement that they do not interfere or slow down
communications by a significant extent. Hence they are designed to be light weight and
because of this requirement they may not be aware of details of the protocol semantics on
the target systems. Handley et al [8] suggests that such monitors may not be able to detect
the ambiguities in network traffic and may be susceptible to the activity of a clever
intruder, (e.g. some monitors may not be programmed to reassemble fragmented packets,
or may not be aware of the underlying topology of the network). Ptacek and Newsham
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[24] have shown that the basic principle behind network intrusion detection, namely
passive protocol analysis, is not sufficient to stop attacks and it is possible to dupe
the
IDS.
3.4 Susceptibility of pH IDS
Wagner et al [27] have shown the failure of pH IDS in stopping mimicry or evasion
attacks. In this category of attacks, the intruders try to hide their presence by not
generating abnormal traces of system calls. Since the IDS does not see anything which it
has not seen before, it fails to trigger an alarm. The authors of [27] have suggested some
ways in which these attacks can be carried out and this throws some light and also calls
for more discussion on two issues, firstly how to patch the pH IDS to mitigate these kind
of attacks and secondly the practical risk involved in these kind of attacks.
The above work lists a few ways in which evasion attacks can be carried out. The threat
and the potential of damage from this kind of attacks is explained and is equal to, if not
greater than that from any other category of intrusions and attacks. What must be
ascertained is, how much resources are needed by the intruder in terms of time, effort,
system capabilities and most importantly, expertise to successfully carry out this kind of
attacks. Obviously it is difficult to quantify these requirements, but a scientific
approximation can be obtained, which should be able to indicate, how critical is the need
to develop a countermeasure against, this form of intrusion.
Some approaches to carrying out mimicry attacks, which are put forth by Wagner et al
[27], seem practically impossible (though theoretically feasible) as this has been
acknowledged by the authors themselves. The authors claim that it might be possible for
intruders to acquire root privileges by exploiting vulnerabilities in the OS and then
inflict damage without issuing any system calls. However the extent of this damage
would be restricted, ifnot trivial, as any significant damage to the system or environment
requires circumventing the normal permission-level controls on its resources and this
would need interaction with the underlying OS through the use of system calls. Another
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approach suggests that the intruder could wait till a certain point of time, when his
malicious code sequence would pass as normal. The pH IDS keeps learning more about
the programs and processes that it monitors and ofien it observes new or abnormal
activity that in fact could very well be simply evolving legitimate user behavior. It then is
up to the system administration to determine whether this new activity is indeed intrusive
or legal activity that needs to be added to its definition of normal. Thus, though it is
possible that the definition ofnormal might change over a period of time and this change
is visible to the intruder, it seems very unlikely that it will ever accommodate serious
harmful intrusive activity (e.g., it is unlikely that sendmaiV program would repeatedly
access or modify system files, an ftp server or client program would escalate the
permissions on files).
Thus it seems fairly implausible that these two approaches would be successful in
deceiving the IDS and avoiding detection. In the unlikely event that somehow, either of
the two above approaches does manage to produce a successful intrusion and evade
detection, pH IDS would be able to do very little to thwart it , unless its design or
detection algorithm is altered radically.
The other two suggested ways of carrying out evasion attacks are relatively more
plausible and interesting with respect to developing a solution against this. The authors of
[27] have pointed out that intruders could substitute the arguments passed to system calls,
by some illegal parameters and achieve the desired results. Thus if the intruder wanted to
modify the /etc/syslog . conf file, after gaining root access, instead ofwaiting for
the system call
open('
/etc/syslog. conf, write) to appear in the normal execution
stream, he could use any open call and replace its parameter by the desired file name.
This is possible because pH IDS does not take into account the arguments that are passed
to system calls while creating normal patterns. This is a significant method of carrying
out evasion attacks that can produce the desired results for the intruder and which should
be explored further. It is reasonable to assume that if this IDS, is deployed widely, its
working is apparent to the intruder and he can replicate the database of normal behavior
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on his Consequently the allowed sequences of system calls are readily available
to the intruder and after studying these patterns he can easily pick those traces that could
be exploited by replacing the call parameters. Also, this activity would not require
extraordinary skills or system resources and the only requirement that is needed on the
intruder's part, is investment of some time in to studying the traces and finding the right
one to manipulate.
The other significant means of carrying out evasion attacks involves generating
equivalent traces of malicious code. These modified sequences have the same effect as
the original malicious streams and modifications make them look more like normal code
sequences that can pass without detection. According to authors of [27] this is possible by
interleaving ordinary system calls in between the malicious sequence and taking care to
see that these newly introduced system calls are in feet semantic 'no-ops'. Examples of
such calls include system calls that fail, calls with invalid parameters, opening and
immediately closing a file, reading 0 bytes, reading file descriptor values etc. This form
of attack could work because the IDS typically ignores, the return values from system
calls and even though, a system call may fail, it is still recorded as a part of the trace. The
intruder is aided in this as almost all system calls in UNIX can be used to pass off as no-
ops. Also note that, occasional mismatches are allowed by the IDS and so an intruder just
needs to modify his malicious sequence only so much as to appear close to a normal
strain. However, this approach calls for slight sophistication and expertise on the part of
the intruder. A knowledgeable intruder is most likely to come up with some sort of
software tool, a constraint based sequence generator that takes in the malicious stream,
mixes it with some innocuous system calls and returns a trace that is a close
approximation to those defined in the normal database.
*
As a side thought, since the pH IDS is licensed under the GNU Public license, it makes the intruder's task
a little less complicated, since he can readily obtain the complete working source code.
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Chapter 4
Modifications and Experiments with pH
4.1 Testing environment
For the purpose of this thesis, pH version 0.22 was used in all tests and analysis, which
works with the then-current Linux kernel version 2.4.20. Since its release, pH has
undergone slight modifications that adapt it to the newer kernels and also fix some bugs
that were detected along the way. The authors of pH developed and scripted it on a
Debian distribution of Linux and it is supposed to work with other distributions as well
with minimum modifications, if any. (This was not entirely true, as the efforts to patch a
Red Hat 9 Linux distribution proved later.)
All the work for the thesis was carried out on a Red Hat 9 Linux distribution, running a
2.4.20 kernel that was patched with pH version 0.22. Since the kernels that ship with
most of the popular distributions ofLinux are already heavily patched and altered, the pH
patch could not be cleanly applied to the kernel source that came with Red Hat, even after
some manual tweaking. Hence a clean 2.4.20 version kernel source was obtained from
http://www.kernel.org and was used to install the patch. After this patch had
been applied, the modified source of the kernel had to be recompiled. There were many
problems encountered when the new modified kernel was made to boot. On every
attempt, the kernel boot process would fail with the notorious, 'Kernel panic
- No init
found'
error message. The boot process in Linux is controlled by special programs known
as boot loaders. Lilo and Grub are the most commonly used boot loaders. On the test
machine lilo was used and the most common source of errors that generate the 'kernel
panic'
failure message are because of faulty contents of lilo's configuration file,
/etc/lilo.conf . This file specifies where the /root and /boot partitions, the init
process, and other parameters which are to be used while booting are located. Even after
checking this file for correctness, the kernel would not boot. In some cases, some of the
programs that are needed for the boot process (e.g. support for the ext3 filesystem type)
are compiled as modules and hence unavailable while booting up. But after changing the
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configuration options before compiling and thus building a heavily loaded kernel, the
boot process would still fail.
After hours of debugging in assembly and trying most of the well known causes of this
failure, the source of the problem was discovered. The pH patch calls a custom function
before any system calls are executed. This function decides whether the current system
call is anomalous or not. But the pH source makes some assumptions about the state of
the stack and its register contents when this call is made that are unique to the Debian
distribution. When the call to this function was entirely commented out, essentially
nullifying any changes by pH, the kernel would boot as expected. However when
majority of the body of this function was commented out, but the call to the function left
untouched, again the kernel would not boot. This suggested some problem with function
calling convention and the environment in which the call was made. After looking at the
assembly code generated by the compiler for certain C files, it was found that the stack
did not contain the set of parameters expected by the function. A work-around to this
problem was designed by manipulating the contents of stack by pushing some register
contents on to it before the function call and adjusting the stack pointer.
The Linux box used in the tests was not connected to the Internet and was part of a small
local area network in the Computer Security Laboratory at Rochester Institute of
Technology. This network was completely isolated from the campus network (and, thus
the Internet); this ensured that while pH was in its learning phase, it was not exposed to
the possible hostile activity from the outside network. An environment similar to the one
in which pH was originally tested [22] was created; the only significant difference
between the two environments, was the time that pH waited for the profile to normalize
after it was frozen. The 'time to
normalize'
was programmed to be two weeks in the
original source. Because of time constraints, this was set a lower value and was varied
from program to program, depending on its complexity. A process or program like 'su',
the UNIX substitute user utility, was able to normalize far quickly than a relatively more
complex program like 'pHmon', the graphical utility which was used to control and set
the various parameters for pH. It was observed that
'su'




never normalized, though it was found to be frozen at times.
Similar behavior was seen in [22], where the experimental analysis was carried out for
longer periods of time.
The system was made to run most of the normal daily activities and programs that are
executed on a personal computer, such as editing files, compiling and running C
programs, setting and changing system configurations, running audio CDs,writing to CD
media, playing games, installing and updating modules, tarring and un-tarring archives
etc. Even though the machine was not connected to the Internet, the Mozilla browser was
run to just to capture some of its behavior; similarly email programs (Ximian, Sendmail)
were invoked even though no mail servers were running. For our tests, any erroneously
behaving process or program would have worked regardless of whether it was remote or
local. An exploit that worked on a
'Ipr'





4.2 Classification of system calls
One of the critical ways of disguising mimicry attacks against pH IDS is by the addition
of
'no-ops'
[27]. An intruder's malicious sequence of instructions is bound to tanslate
into a sequence of system calls that does not match the look-ahead pairs in the normal
profiles, and thus generates a number of anomalies. However, it may be possible for the
intruder to interpolate his malicious sequence of system calls with extraneous system
calls that make his exploit sequence resemble some sequence in the normal profile. The
intruder only needs to ensure that these system calls do not nullify the effect of his
malicious sequence; the added calls have no effect on the program's performance, and
thus are known as'no-ops'. Wagner et al [27] suggest that this is not too difficult a task as
most of the Linux system calls can be easily used as no-ops. Most system calls that take
parameters can be nullified by passing incorrect parameters that cause them to fail, such
as by opening a non-existent file. Even though, these system calls have no real effect, pH
records them since they were attempted and does not check if they actually succeeded or
not.
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Consider a buffer overflow attack script which exploits an array bound checking error in
a program, manipulates the return address on stack and continues execution from a point
in memory where the malicious code is located. This is usually followed by a call to a
system call that manipulates UID and/or GID for the process (e.g. setreuidO in
Linux), often setting it to that of the super-user and then executing a shell with the
execve ( "bin/
sh"
,...,.... ) command. In most of the cases, the calls to
setreuid ( ) and execve ( ) , will be flagged as anomalous by the IDS. But there is a
possibility that the profile of the program being exploited may contain setreuid and
execve calls that are part of a sequence and separated by a few other system calls. All the
intruder must do, is to interpolate the sequence between setreuid and execve calls
with other system calls from the profile and ensure that these calls do not interfere with
the effect of the setreuid and execve calls.
On close observation of the effect of system calls and the purpose that they serve, it can
be concluded that, most system calls can be classified into two sets. Some system calls
merely return status information to the calling program. Typically information about the
system resources or processes themselves, (e.g. system calls like getpid ( ) ,
getrlimitO , getpriority ( ) , sysinfoO). The intruder does not have to
worry about negating their effect, since the information returned by these calls can be
merely ignored. These do not change the state of the system and consequently, the
intruder's malicious calls would continue to have the desired effect. The other set of
system calls are those, which bring about some change in the state of the system or the
process. These calls are harder for the intruder to use as no-ops, as their effects must be
taken into consideration and countered if necessary.
With respect to stopping mimicry attacks the first set of system calls provide an
interesting solution. This first set of system calls can be considered as the set of
'innocuous'
system calls, as they do not provide significant information about how the
process is behaving and merely add extra data to the profiles of programs. On the other
hand, system calls like fork ( ) , execve ( ) , write ( ) , open ( ) , close ( ) ,
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ptrace ( ) , kill ( ) etc. denote critical points in the lifetime of a process and are an
integral part of the profile of a program. By including the set of innocuous calls in the
profile of a program, we are in effect, providing the intruder with means to make his
malicious sequence appear as normal. Of course, it may not be possible to synthetically
generate a normal sequence out of every malicious sequence for all programs. There may
be instances, when a pair of specific system call never appears in any normal sequence.
But as Wagner et al [27] have shown, this task is not as hard as it seems. This leads us to
our hypothesis.
It may be possible to construct the profiles of programs out of only the set of critical
system calls and still be able be create reasonably accurate profiles of normal behavior,
and then to use them to identify intrusive behavior. By doing this, we eliminate the
freedom that the intruder has, in manipulating his sequence. Obviously, by including the
complete set of system calls, we capture the process behavior on a finer scale with more
granularity. But this level of high accuracy may not be necessary to distinguish between
normal and abnormal. Another problem is of false positives. There are bound to be some
variations between the program behavior observed during the learning phase and its
behavior in a live environment. When we include all system calls in the profiles, the
problem of occasional mismatches becomes more prominent; in order to not reduce the
effectiveness of the analysis because of false positives, we need to ignore a higher
number ofmismatches. This itself gives a slight advantage to the intruder, who can limit
his anomalous mismatches to an acceptable level and deceive the IDS. Ifwe include too
few system calls in program definitions, we get incomplete profiles, which do not reflect
program behavior closely. It would also then become difficult to distinguish between
profiles of two different programs. We believe there is a range of values between the
above two extremes, a sort of a threshold, which can enable us to create profiles which
are just accurate enough to distinguish between abnormal and normal behavior and solve
the above problems as well.
The detection algorithm was modified to observe certain system calls and ignore the rest.
Some of the guidelines used in the classification of system calls were:
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a. Exclude system calls that merely return system or process information.
b. Include calls that change state of the system or the process, i.e. create/delete files,
change permissions, manipulate memory segments, add/initialize modules,
etc.
c. Exclude calls that change system, but without altering control flow of a process.
d. Do not exclude calls with parameters only because they are likely to be misused
by the intruder by manipulating their parameters. We take care of this possibility
by testing the other modification that we propose below.
The goal of this exercise was not to derive a perfect set of system calls, which solved the
above problems, since it is unlikely that there is exists such an optimal set. These rules
were simply a rough guideline for classification, as some system calls do not fit into
either of the category above, while some fall into more than one. In case of doubtful
system calls, personal judgment and discretion was used. The results that we obtained
with our classification could possibly have also been achieved by implementing a slightly
different version of the classification that follows. We wanted to identify a class or range
of system calls that could solve the above problem. The classification that was used for
the tests is provided in Appendix A
A total of 42 system calls were excluded from the profiles. After these modifications in
the source code of pH, the kernel was recompiled and all the previously created profiles
were cleared. The learning phase was restarted right from scratch. The time to normalize
and start monitoring was varied from program to program. After the learning phase was
complete the next step was to find out how these new profiles preformed in comparison
to those obtained prior to the classification. We tested this in two ways. We tested some
exploit scripts and checked if the modified version of pH could detect these. The other
interesting behavior to observe was whether pH produced a higher rate of false positives
than before.
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4.3 Tracking of erroneous system calls
The other change effected in pH's detection algorithm was the tracking of the number of
system calls that return errors per process. According to our hypothesis and as explained
in [27], an erroneously behaving process that was under an evasion attack would exhibit
an abnormally large number of system calls that fail. The normal behavior of a process is
learned by observing its traces of system calls in a secure environment; we believed it
would be possible to also characterize every program by the number of system calls that
fail in a secure environment, when the process is behaving normally. After observing this
value for a number of instances of the same process, we believed we could arrive at a
threshold or a range of values for every program. During the monitoring phase, other than
watching the traces of system calls, we would also watch the result of the system call
execution and count the number of calls that fail. If this value was higher than the set
limit, we could suspect that the process was behaving abnormally, based on the rationale
that an erroneously behaving process was likely to generate a significantly large number
of errors. As the results of our tests proved later, this was a flawed assumption.
One issue in implementing this was deciding where in the sequence of events that
constitutes servicing a slow interrupt or a system call, we should place the code that
checks for the return value. After a system call returns, the ret_from_syscall
assembler routine is run, which checks if any other interrupts are pending and if any
'bottom
halves'
need to be serviced.(Bottom halves are parts from an earlier interrupt
routine, that were set aside for later execution, because their operation was not too critical
with respect to the interrupt.) We did not want to interfere with execution of this routine
and disturb the stack contents as it was not certain, how our modifications might affect
the other kernel routines and register contents. Before the call to the
ret_from routine, and just before the sys_call assembler macro
returned, a call was made to our function pH_check_ret_value ( ) . The registers
were saved to the stack, the return value from EAX register was put on the stack and a
kernel space function was invoked. To check the return value and keep a count of the
erroneous calls for every process periodically, statistical information was produced and
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written to a log file by the kernel. The result from this modification and our findings are
explained in the next chapter. An architectural view of pH after the modifications is
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5.1 Outcome from classification of system calls
To test the effect of the changes made to pH's detection algorithm by editing the set of
system calls it monitors, it was necessary to observe both its success in stopping
intrusions and whether there was any effect on its response in the absence of intrusions.
To test the response of pH to intrusions, we tried to collect exploits obtained from the
Internet. We limited these to local exploits that will be typically executed by a user who
already has physical access to the system and also possibly a local user account.
A significant number of the exploits we found were buffer overflow attacks that granted
super-user status to a local user. One such attack script we found, was an exploit that
worked against a vulnerability in the game Xgalaga. The attack script invoked the game
from the shell with specific input parameters that created a specially designed shellcode
that changed privilege levels and then opened a shell. This shellcode was copied onto the
stack; after some address manipulation, command execution continued from the region in
stack, where the shellcode was placed. Slight modifications to the attack script were
made to allow it to work on the test machine, which required changing some offset
values. The exploit code is provided in Appendix B.
pH was successfully able to detect and stop this attack. When pH detects an anomalous
system call, it delays the process for a time that is proportional to tie number of
anomalous look-ahead pairs generated by this system call. When pH was disabled and the
exploit was run, a shell was opened with root privileges. Below is a part of the system
call trace that is generated by the above exploit and that displays the execve system call
that generates anomalies. The UNIX s trace utility was used to track the system calls
for the process.
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Old_mmap(0x402d0000, 4096, PROT_READ| PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED,
3, 0x7000) = 0x402d0000
close(3) = 0




fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=82320, ...}) =0
old_mmap(NULL, 92688, PR0T_READ | PR0T_EXEC , MAP_PRIVATE, 3 , 0) =
0x402dl000
old_mmap (0x402 e5000, 4096, PROT_READ| PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED ,
3, 0x13000) = 0x402e5000
Old_mmap(0x402e6000, 6672, PROT_READ| PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x402e6000
close(3) = 0
munmap (0x40017000, 62176) = 0
gettimeofday ({1088696857, 176383}, NULL) = 0
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\0\0+\\", 4) =4
\0\0\0\2", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
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\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
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\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 20) = 20
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\0\0\0\0", 4) =4
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. byi . Pyi , py,i , byi , byi , byl , byi ,wi , Pyi . byi .wi > pyi . by<L . pyi . pyi . pyi . pyi . py
i . byi . Pyi , Pyi , pyi , pyi , pyi , pyi , pyi . byi . pyi . byi , pyi . byi ^yi\fo a/.x ga i sc
ores", o_rdonly) = -1 enoent (No such file or directory)
fstat64(l, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(136, 4), ...})=0
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS ,
-
1, 0) = 0x40017000
write(l, "Trouble opening high scores file"..., 322) = 322
close(-l) = -1 ebadf (Bad file
descriptor)
syscall_4294967111(0xbffffa02, 0x9, 0x9, OxbffffaOa, Ox8053ebO,
Oxbffffe2c, Oxffffffda, 0x2b, 0x2b, 0, 0, 0xffffff47, Oxbffffe30, 0x23,
0x286, Oxbffff838, 0x2b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
-1 (errno 38)
execve("//bin/sh", ["//bin/sh"] , [/* 0 vars */]) = 0
uname({sys="Linux", node="localhost , ...}) = 0
brk(O) = Ox80e5b54
old_ttimap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_AN0NYMOUS,
-
1, 0) = 0x40016000
open("/etc/ld. so. preload", o_rdonly) = -1 enoent (no such file or
di rectory)
open("/etc/ld. so. cache", 0_RD0NLY) = 3
fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=62176, ...})=0
Fig. 5.1 Partial system call trace ofXgalaga exploit.
The system call sequence which is seen by pH and that causes anomalies is :
gettimeof theday, open, close, open, fstat64, old_mmap, write, close, execve
The call to execve generates eight anomalous look-ahead pairs. This was because in the
time that was spent in learning
Xgalaga'
s system call traces, execve was never spotted
other than, the instance of the first execve call which loads and runs the Xgalaga
process. The execution of the execve system call is delayed and the process is
suspended.
Other exploits were also tried, such as a vulnerability in
'Ipr'
(the printing program) that
was found on the Internet. However, it was only possible to make the Xgalaga exploit
work on the test machine. Many of these vulnerabilities work against older versions of
the kernel and applications. Kernel version 2.4.20 and Red Hat version 9.0 are fairly
recent, and as a result there are fewer vulnerabilities against the programs and software
associated with them.
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The other significant observation from testing this modification was the behavior
of the
new profiles. The newer profiles generated marginally more false positives
and there was
no noticeable difference in the behavior or response of the system to these changes.
These increase in the number of anomalies were expected and could be attributed to a
combination of factors, specifically, the reduced number of system calls in the profiles
(which generated less accurate reproduction of normal behavior) and the reduced time
spent in learning about normal behavior. To compare how the profiles grew under the
two schemes, statistical data for Xgalaga was recorded. In this test, the total number of
system calls executed, the total number of new call sequences discovered, and the total
number of look-ahead pairs generated by these new sequences were recorded. This data
was collected after running the Xgalaga program periodically and, for a similar amount
of time in both the instances.
Readings after first interval
Before After
Total Calls 184812 176566
Total Sequences 319 235
Total Pairs 1015 816
Readings after second interval
Before After
Total Calls 401327 341341
Total Sequences 406 246
Total Pairs 1284 835
Readings after third interval
Before After
Total Calls 539236 480457
Total Sequences 486 249
Total Pairs 1376 840
Readings after fourth interval
Before After
Total Calls 889521 810405
Total Sequences 632 251
Total Pairs 1720 842
Fig. 5.2 Growth ofprofile before and after modifications.
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The figures above and the response of pH, show that by restricting the number of system
calls that are monitored, we improve the performance ofpH. The chances ofpH detecting
an evasion attack are increased and at the same time there is no significant impact of false
positives on its performance. The other advantage of this modification is the decrease in
overhead, since we do not analyze or inspect every system call. Though the profiles
occupy the same amount of memory, they contain a far smaller number of look-ahead
pairs; thus the time spent in preprocessing system calls decreases (on average) for a
process. The above figures also indicate that by adding all system calls to our analysis,
we are merely including redundant data in the profiles.
5.2 Outcome from tracking erroneous system calls
Initially the number of system calls expected to fail per process was set as a hard coded
value of ten, for all processes. This turned out to be a serious miscalculation as, even a
simple operation of opening and closing a text editor like vi, without editing or modifying
any files, generates thousands of system calls out of which about 10% fail. pH was
initially programmed to count the number of errors per process and, if they exceeded the
expected number, to delay the process for a period of two days. This resulted in the
system appearing to freeze repeatedly, if not all the time, because most of the processes
were being delayed. (As an example, when an attempt was made to open the shell or the
terminal on the KDE desktop, the process would be started but the terminal window





This behavior was initially attributed to a programming error, but closer observation
revealed the fact that the value of ten as a limit for erroneous calls was significantly too
low.
This limit was increased to fifty and the response of pH was disabled. Instead of the
processes being delayed, we opted to collect statistical information about the process in a
log file. We made note of the number of system calls required for a process to generate
various number of errors (50,100,150,200 etc), in order to determine if there was a
pattern in the distribution of erroneous system calls. The output obtained from the log file
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was compared with the data obtained from monitoring the execution of the process with
the UNIX st race program. Both these sources revealed identical numbers, which
nullified the possibilities of programming errors in our code. Shown below is sample
output obtained from the strace utility and the distribution of errors obtained from our










% time seconds usecs/call calls errors syscall
93.47 1.030039 3344 308 134 select
2 . 10 0.023143 30 784 write
2.00 0. 022060 13 1655 136 read
1.04 0. 011468 104 110 writev
0.48 0.005256 6 863 750 stat64
0.15 0. 001705 2 916 134 sigreturn
0.15 0.001702 6 265 65 open
0.11 0.001235 2 795 gettimeofday
0.10 0.001114 2 730 brk
0.10 0.001091 4 252 ioctl
0.05 0.000565 4 139 old mmap
0.04 0.000407 2 201 close
0.03 0.000340 4 85 munmap
0.02 0. 000258 2 151 setitimer
0.02 0.000216 2 119 kill
0.02 0.000210 2 117 fstat64
0.02 0. 000184 2 115 llseek
0.02 0.000183 7 27 readv
0.01 0.000158 1 122 getpid
0.01 0.000158 5 34 22 access
0.01 0.000108 54 2 1 connect
0 .01 0.000072 6 12 getdents64
0.00 0.000052 3 15 15 readlink
0. 00 0. 000047 2 25 rt sigprocmask
0.00 0.000047 2 26 fcntl64
0.00 0.000046 5 10 1 lstat64
0.00 0.000039 2 24 rt sigaction
0.00 0.000023 12 2 socket
0. 00 0.000021 21 1 mmap2
0.00 0.000016 2 8 uname
0.00 0.000013 1 9 getegid32
0.00 0.000006 3 2 alarm
0. 00 0.000004 4 1 1 unlink
0.00 0.000003 2 2 getpgid
0.00 0.000002 2 1 setpgid
0.00 0. 000002 2 1 setrlimit
0.00 0.000002 2 1 getrlimit
0.00 0.000002 2 1 getuid32
0.00 0.000002 2 1 geteuid32
100.00 1. 101999 7932 1259 total
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Fig. 5.4 Graphical representation of rate of generation of errors for emacs. Refer to









0-F-MW n.irn, tafljl n^njl^fl^r*
50 200 350 500 650 800 950 1100
No of errors
E3 No of calls per 50 errors
Fig. 5.5 Graphical representation of distribution of errors for emacs. Refer to
Appendix C for data values.
The above graph shows the number of system calls needed to generate sets of erroneous
calls for a short execution of the emacs program. This graph illustrates the random
variation in the distribution of errors. The number of errors never stabilized over a large
enough region of process execution, suggesting that i is virtually impossible to predict
the number of system call errors that might be generated for a process, and that even
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within a process the distribution of errors is without any detectable patterns. Similar
results were obtained for other normally behaving processes.
The lack of a pattern in the distribution of errors becomes more evident when the output
for the two processes of the same executable are compared, and the two processes are
made to perform slightly different tasks. This enables us to compare the results for two
different execution paths of the same program. The output obtained above is for the case
when, emacs was made to open a file and no other operations were performed on it.
The following output is for the instance when emacs was made to open a file and the file
was searched for textual patterns, content was modified, changes were saved, and other
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Fig. 5.6. Graphical representation of distribution of errors for emacs, when a file
was edited. Refer to Appendix C for data values.
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From Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6, it is evident that there are no common regions in the execution
traces of emacs that display similar patterns or an identical distribution. This indicates
that as the program flow assumes different execution paths, the distribution of errors
varies too and it becomes even more difficult to arrive at a typical value for the limit of
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Fig. 5.7 Graphical representation ofdistribution of errors for pHmon. Refer to
Appendix C for data values.
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Similar behavior was observed in case of the execution of pHmon\ a graphical utility
provided along with pH that lets you monitor the state of pH on a per process basis. This
is shown in the above figure. As compared to emacs, pHmon is a fairly complex program,
generating a large number of system calls.
5.3 Conclusion
The above results indicate the virtue of restricting the set of system calls that are
monitored to learn normal behavior. They show that same amount of information, if not
more, is obtained by working with a smaller set of system calls. This also reduces the
total time spent by the process in IDS related analysis and processing, thus improving the
overall performance. Bernaschi et al [3] proposed a similar approach in their work related
to intercepting system calls. Their implementation was however completely different than
the approach of pH IDS and was an enhancement to the Linux kernel, rather than a full-
fledged IDS. They also looked at system call arguments in deciding whether a system call
invocation was anomalous. They achieved reasonable amount of success against buffer
overflow attacks with this methodology. Our results thus confirm the hypothesis that
classification of system calls is an efficient method to improve performance of the IDS.
On the other hand, our other results prove that not much information can be gathered
about the nature of a process, by simply looking at the number of system calls that fail.
Variations in the distribution of errors and the number of errors are too high even for a
normally behaving process. Even if a threshold or a limit on the number of calls that are
allowed to fail were discovered, it would be easy for the intruder to vary the number of
erroneous calls and escape detection, as it is difficult and virtually impossible to create a
boundary between abnormal and normal behavior by simply hard coding a value for
allowable erroneous calls.
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5.4 Scope for future work
There are a few drawbacks related to our tests and results. It is not known how a slightly
different classification of system calls would affect the performance of pH. More
experimentation with different sets of calls is needed. There probably is no optimal set of
system calls that yields best results. Also measuring the effectiveness of, performance of
an IDS is an area which has not received significant attention within the research
community. No tools exist to compare two IDSs, so it is difficult to predict what are 'best
results'
in this case. The metrics used currently (rate of false positives, time to learn
normal behavior, and the ability to stop attacks) are dependent on factors like the
environment and versions of software in use and cannot be directly used to evaluate two
IDSs. With respect to our tests, it would be interesting to determine if there exists a range
of numbers of system calls such that if fewer system calls are chosen than this value, the
performance deteriorates noticeably, while if more system calls are included, no
significant improvement is observed. Our results do hint that such an 'optimal
range'
could exist.
We have not tested pH with our modifications against a broad range of attacks. We
limited our tests to local exploits. Our results serve as 'proof
of-concept'
and should be
tested against remote exploits and different kinds of intrusions to attain more credibility.
Though much interest has been generated in system call based intrusion detection
systems, most of these ignore the parameters and arguments of system calls. In their
investigations, Bernuschi et al [3] and Wagner and Dean [26] considered system call
arguments, but in both these instances the parameters of only a handful of system calls
were processed. Wagner and Sato [27] have shown that the most critical way of carrying
out mimicry attacks on pH IDS is by the substitution of system call arguments. This
problem is difficult to overcome because even for the same system call, there is
significant variation in the number, type and values of legal arguments, is significant.
Processing all arguments for all attempted calls will be too expensive. There is scope for
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further work with respect to dealing with system call arguments, possibly using concepts
of artificial intelligence, neural networks and machine learning to solve this problem.
Our results have also proved that it is not possible to characterize the behavior of a
process by merely looking at the number of system calls that fail per process, as was
suggested in [27]. However, this information about the process, in combination with
some other observable, may give us more data about the behavior of a process. The
execution of a program can be broken down into different stages: loading of the program,
initialization, accessing system files and libraries, actual execution of the main body,
closing files and clearing used resources and final bookkeeping (if any). Each of these
stages can be expected to display varying number of system calls that fail. So rather than
looking at the entire process, analysis could be spread over different regions of the
process. Another possible solution would be to study the nature and type of errors
generated. It is reasonable to assume that an error caused in opening a file because of
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APPENDIX A
Classification of system calls
INNOCUOUS SYSTEM CALLS- Excluded from profiles.
Sys
Call No
Name Category Sys Call
No
Name Category
3 Read File System 116 Sysinfo Proc Mgmt
13 Time ProcMgmt 122 Newuname Proc Mgmt
20 Getpid ProcMgmt 132 Getpgid ProcMgmt
24 getuidl6 ProcMgmt 135 Sysfs File System
43 Times ProcMgmt 136 Personality Proc Mgmt
45 Brk Proc Mgmt 141 Getdents File System
47 getgidl6 Proc Mgmt 145 Readv File System
49 geteuidl6 ProcMgmt 147 Getsid Proc Mgmt
50 getegidl6 ProcMgmt 155 sched_getparam Proc Mgmt
64 Getppid Proc Mgmt 157 sched_getscheduler Proc Mgmt
65 Getpgrp Proc Mgmt 159 sched__get_priority_max ProcMgmt
76 old_getrlimit Proc Mgmt 160 sched_get_priority_min Proc Mgmt
77 Getrusage ProcMgmt 165 Getreusidl6 Proc Mgmt
78 Gettimeofday Proc Mgmt 171 Getresgidl6 Proc Mgmt
80 Getgroupsl6 ProcMgmt 191 Getrlimit Proc Mgmt
85 Readlink File System 199 Getuid ProcMgmt
89 old_readdir File System 200 Getgid Proc Mgmt
96 Getpriority Proc Mgmt 201 Geteuid Proc Mgmt
103 Syslog ProcMgmt 202 Getegid ProcMgmt
105 Getitimer Proc Mgmt 209 Getresuid ProcMgmt
109 Uname Proc Mgmt 211 Getresgid Proc Mgmt
[ Note : Proc Mgmt
- Process Management, Mem Mgmt - MemoryManagement
Comm - Communication, Misc
- Miscellaneous ]
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1 Exit Proc Mgmt 36 Sync File System
2 Fork Proc Mgmt 37 Kill Proc Mgmt
4 Write File System 38 rename File System
5 Open File System 39 Mkdir File System
6 Close File System 40 Rmdir File System
7 Waitpid Proc Mgmt 41 Dup File System
8 Creat File System 42 Pipe File System
9 Link File System 46 Setgidl6 Proc Mgmt
10 Unlink File System 48 signa] Proc Mgmt
11 Execve File System 51 Acct Misc
12 Chdir File System 52 umount File System
14 Mknod File System 54 Ioctl File System
15 Chmod File System 55 Fcntl File System
16 lchown 1 6 File System 57 setpgid Proc Mgmt
18 Stat File System 59 olduname Proc Mgmt
19 Lseek File System 60 umask File System
21 Mount File System 61 chroot File System
22 Oldumount File System 62 Ustat Misc
23 setuid!6 Proc Mgmt 63 dup2 File System
25 Stime Proc Mgmt 66 Setsid Proc Mgmt
26 Ptrace Proc Mgmt 67 sigaction Proc Mgmt
27 Alarm Proc Mgmt 68 sgetmask Proc Mgmt
28 Fstat File System 69 ssetmask Proc Mgmt
29 Pause Proc Mgmt 70 setreuid 16 Proc Mgmt
30 Utime File System 71 setregidl6 Proc Mgmt
33 Access File System 72 sigsuspend Proc Mgmt
34 Nice Proc Mgmt 73 sigpending Proc Mgmt
74 Sethostname Proc Mgmt 117 Ipc Comm
75 Setrlimit Proc Mgmt 118 Fsync File System
79 Settimeofday Proc Mgmt 119 sigreturn Proc Mgmt
81 setgroups 1 6 Proc Mgmt 120 Clone Proc Mgmt
82 old_select File System 121 setdomainname Proc Mgmt
83 Symlink File System 123 modify_ldt Proc Mgmt
84 Lstat File System 124 adjtimex Proc Mgmt
86 Uselib File System 125 mprotect MemMgmt
87 Swapon Mem Mgmt 126 sigprocmask Proc Mgmt
88 Reboot Proc Mgmt 127 create_module Proc Mgmt
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90 old_mmap MemMgmt 128 init_module Proc Mgmt
91 Munmap Mem Mgmt 129 delete_module Proc Mgmt
92 Truncate File System 130 get_kemel_syms Proc Mgmt
93 Ftruncate File System 131 quoactl File System
94 Fchmod File System 133 fchdir File System
95 fchownl6 File System 134 bdflush File System
97 setpriority Proc Mgmt 138 setfsuidl6 Proc
Mgmt
99 Statfs File System 139 setfsgidl6 Proc Mgmt
100 Fstatfs File System 140 Llseek File System
101 loperm Proc Mgmt 142 select File System
102 socketcall Coram 143 Flock File System
104 Setitimer Proc Mgmt 144 msync MemMgmt
106 Newstat File System 146 writev File System
107 Newlstat File System 149 fdatasync File System
108 Newfstat File System 150 sysctl Proc Mgmt
110 Iopl Proc Mgmt 151 mlock MemMgmt
111 Vhangup File System 152 mun lock Mem Mgmt
113 vm86old Proc Mgmt 153 mlockall MemMgmt
114 wait4 Proc Mgmt 154 Sched_setparam Proc Mgmt
115 Swapoff Mem Mgmt 156 Sched_setscheduler ProcMgmt
158 sched_yield Proc Mgmt 187 sendfile Comm
161 sched_rr_get_interval Proc Mgmt 192 mmap2 MemMgmt
162 nanosleep Proc Mgmt 193 truncate64 File System
163 Mremap Mem Mgmt 194 ftruncate64 File System
164 Setresuidl6 Proc Mgmt 195 stat64 File System
166 vm_86 Proc Mgmt 196 lstat64 File System
167 query_module Misc 197 fstat64 File System
168 Poll File System 203 setreuid Proc Mgmt
169 nfsservctl Misc 204 setregid Proc Mgmt
170 Setresgidl6 Proc Mgmt 206 setgroups Proc Mgmt
172 Prctl Proc Mgmt 207 fchown File System
173 rt_sigreturn Proc Mgmt 208 setresuid Proc Mgmt
174 rt_sigaction Proc Mgmt 210 setresgid Proc Mgmt
175 rt_sigprocmask Proc Mgmt 212 chown File System
176 rt_sigpending Proc Mgmt 213 Setuid Proc Mgmt
177 rt_sigtimedwait Proc Mgmt 214 Setgid Proc Mgmt
178 rt__sigqueueinfo Proc Mgmt 215 setfsuid File System
179 rt_sigsuspend Proc Mgmt 216 setfsgid File System
180 Pread File System 217 Pivot_root Misc
181 Pwrite File System 218 mincore Mem Mgmt
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182 chownl6 File System 219 madvise MemMgmt
183 Getcwd File System 220 getdents64 File System
184 Capget Misc 221 fcntl64 File System
185 Capset Misc 224 Gettid Misc
186 sigaltstack Proc Mgmt 225 readahead Misc
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APPENDIX B
Xgalaga game exploit program :
[ Obtained from http: //www. k-otik.com/exploits/ ]
/* 0x333xgalaga => XGalaga 2.0.34 local game exploit (Red Hat 9.0)
*
*
tested against xgalaga-2.0.34-1 .i386.rpm
*
under Red Hat Linux 9.0
*
*
-bug found by Steve Kemp
*
- exploit coded by cOwboy @ 0x333
*
*





















void memret (char *, int, int, int);
void banner (void)
{
fprintf (stdout, "\n\n xgalaga local GAME exploit by cOwboy \n");
fprintf (stdout,
"
Outsiders Se(c)urity Labs / www.Ox333.org \n\n");
}
void memret (char *buffer, int ret, int size, int align)
{
inti;
int * ptr = (int *) (buffer + align);







int ret = RET;
char out[SIZE];
memret ((char *)out, ret, SIZE- 1, 0);
memset ((char *)out, NOP, 33);
memcpy ((char *)out+33, shellcode, strlen(shellcode));
setenv ("HOME", out, 1);
banner ();
execl (BIN, BIN, "-scores", 0x0); // the switch
"-scores"
is necessary to exploit the game
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APPENDIX C
System Call Return Value Data :
1. Data for
'emacs'









50 388 600 4180
100 441 650 4444
150 502 700 4640
200 1820 750 5878
250 2189 800 6096
300 2310 850 6178
350 2445 900 6257
400 2569 950 6476
450 3026 1000 6582
500 3684 1050 6633












50 331 1000 5085
100 389 1050 5334
150 454 1100 5398
200 742 1150 5467
250 931 1200 5540
300 1020 1250 5646
350 1112 1300 6275
400 1195 1350 6391
450 1257 1400 7093
500 1384 1450 7611
550 2011 1500 8822
600 2502 1550 9735
650 2592 1600 11156
700 2815 1650 11949
750 3697 1700 12262
800 3809 1750 12690
850 4005 1800 12808
900 4464 1850 13563













50 438 550 110926
100 558 600 111610
150 1182 650 115705
200 2430 700 116258
250 2564 750 119950
300 2648 800 136180
350 2760 850 136714
400 2845 900 137717
450 3510 950 138701
500 34813 1000 139146
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